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THE QUEST FOR A LACTATING MALE:
BIOLOGY, GENDER, AND DISCRIMINATION
Maureen E. Eldredge∗
I.

Introduction
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the Supreme Court concluded Title VII protections did

not encompass pregnant women because the act only protected against discrimination based on
gender.1 According to the Court, failure to provide disability benefits for pregnancy was a
distinction between two groups of women – pregnant and non-pregnant women – and not a
distinction between women and men, thus it was not discrimination. Congress reacted to Gilbert
with surprising speed, passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) in 1978. The PDA did
provide pregnant women with protection from discrimination.2 However, because the PDA is
often interpreted narrowly and many courts still rely on the reasoning behind Gilbert,3 women
still face discrimination based on their unique biological characteristics.
Courts continue to view gender discrimination claims through a viewpoint of facial
neutrality, refusing to recognize discrimination can exist in cases where women’s biology makes
them actually different then men. For example, in cases involving so-called “sex-plus”
discrimination, where a person is discriminated against based on gender plus an additional factor
(e.g. marital status, race, age, family status), a valid gender discrimination claim can be made
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (1981).
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Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp.2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (relying on Gilbert to deny plaintiff’s claim for
discrimination based on breastfeeding); Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.Supp.2d 884, 889 (S.D. Ohio 2000)
(relying on Gilbert to find that breastfeeding is not protected); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F.Supp. 867, 869
(W.D. Ky 1990) (same); Budde v. Travelers Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 376 (Colo. App. 1986) reversed by Colorado Civil
Rights Commission v. Travelers Insurance Co., 759 P.2d 1358 (Colo. 1988) (relying on Gilbert to hold that lack of
pregnancy coverage was not discrimination).

only where there is a similarly situated subclass of men who are treated differently than women.4
The PDA and Title VII fail to protect women in situations where, by reason of biological
imperatives, a “similarly situated” subclass of men is physically impossible. These situations
include breastfeeding, prescription contraception coverage, and most types of infertility
treatments. It is theoretically possible to compare the requirements of breastfeeding (i.e., the
need to take regular breaks to pump milk) to similar medical requirements (i.e., breaks to stretch
for those with back injuries). However, courts have either been unwilling to make those types of
comparisons5 or such a comparison class, even generously defined, does not exist in the
particular workplace.
Section II of this paper discusses Title VII gender discrimination claims, including
disparate treatment and disparate impact claims. Section III discusses Gilbert and its continued
influence on discrimination law. Section IV explains the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Section
V discusses three types of situations – contraception, breastfeeding, and infertility treatments –
where the unique biology of women creates situations in which comparison to a similar group of
men is impossible. Finally, in Section VI the paper addresses possible solutions to the
limitations of Title VII, including bringing disparate impact claims under Title VII; broadening
the concept of what Title VII and the PDA protects; bringing claims under the ADA; passing
new state or federal legislation; and increasing public pressure on employers.
II.

Title VII

4

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (setting out a four factor test for indirectly proving a
discrimination claim, requiring a similarly situated subclass); Coleman v. B-G Maintenance Management of
Colorado, Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997) (“gender –plus plaintiffs can never be successful if there is no
corresponding subclass of members of the opposite gender.”).
5
See Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc, 49 F.Supp.2d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (no comparison class because “men are
physiologically incapable of pumping breast milk….”); Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.Supp.2d 884, 894
(S.D.Ohio 2000) (no comparison group because “men do not produce breast milk….”).
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed to provide federal protection against
workplace discrimination, thus opening the doors of the job market to all individuals.6
Title VII provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -- (1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.7
A. Types of Gender Discrimination Claims
There are two types of gender discrimination claims: disparate treatment and disparate
impact, each of which has its own set of requirements for a prima facia case. Discrimination is
obvious where an employment policy is explicitly based on gender, such as requiring different
pension contributions from women than from men.8 However, disparate treatment claims allege
different treatment “because of” or “based on” gender, without an overt gender-based policy.
Employers must have intentionally disfavored women (or pregnant women).9 Such claims can
be proved either through direct evidence or indirectly using the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green burden-shifting analysis.10
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See Diana Kasdan, Reclaiming Title VII and the PDA: Prohibiting Workplace Discrimination Against
Breastfeeding Women, 76 N.Y.U.L.REV. 309, 317 (April 2001).
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
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City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 714-18 (1978).
9
Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 647 (Dec. 2001).
10
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Although a racial discrimination case, this test is widely used for gender discrimination
as well.
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Because direct evidence of discrimination is rare, the McDonnell Douglas framework has
become “ubiquitous.”11 This framework requires a plaintiff to show four elements to make a
prima facia case.12 The plaintiff must show 1) she belongs to the protected class (e.g. female or
pregnant); 2) she performed her duties satisfactorily; 3) she suffered an adverse employment
action, and finally, a fourth prong, which in most circuits, requires that similarly situated
employees not in the protected class (e.g. non-pregnant women) were treated better.13 If
successful, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the action. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the
plaintiff.
A defendant can escape liability for gender discrimination if it can show a “bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the normal operation of th[e]
particular business or enterprise.”14 The Supreme Court has interpreted this defense narrowly.15
The “objective, verifiable requirements” must be directly related to the job skills and aptitudes
necessary.16 Furthermore, there must be a high correlation between gender and ability to
perform the job.17
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Julie Manning Magid, Pregnant With Possibility: Reexamining the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 38
AM.BUS.L.J. 819, 836 (Summer 2001) (arguing that it is inappropriate to use McDonnell Douglas framework in
pregnancy discrimination cases because there is rarely a class similarly situated to the plaintiff).
12
The McDonnell Douglas requirements for a prima facia case of racial discrimination are: 1) the plaintiff belongs
to a racial minority; 2) s/he applied and was qualified for the job, for which the employer was seeking applicants; 3)
s/he was rejected despite his/her qualifications; and 4) after such rejection the job remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants. 411 U.S. at 802. The test has been modified to fit many types of discrimination,
including decisions made after hiring. See, e.g. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
13
Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1154-55 (7th Cir. 1997); Magid, supra note 11 at 837. The Tenth Circuit
does not require a comparison to similarly situated co-workers, but states the plaintiff can satisfy the fourth element
in a number of different ways. E.E.O.C. v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1195 n.6 (10th Cir.
2000) (citing plaintiffs meeting the fourth prong by a showing that the position was not eliminated or was filled).
14
42 USC § 2000e-2(e)(1); see also International Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 200-01 (1991).
15
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 201.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 202.
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Title VII not only prohibits disparate treatment, but also prohibits “practices that are fair
in form but discriminatory in practice.”18 In disparate impact claims, there is no requirement to
show intent to discriminate, but the plaintiff must show that facially neutral policies caused
disproportionate harm to a particular class of employee.19 The plaintiff must also show that the
application of the policy cannot be justified by business necessity.20 Generally plaintiffs must
rely on statistical evidence to establish the prima facia case.21
B. Sex-Plus Claims
In some circumstances an employer may not treat men and women differently, but may
treat women (or men) who have a particular, additional characteristic, differently than the
opposite gender with the same additional characteristic. For example, an employer might refuse
to hire women with small children, while agreeing to hire men with small children. In these
situations, characterized as “sex-plus” claims, gender, considered in conjunction with other
characteristics, can result in a protected group under Title VII.22 Sex-plus cases have been
brought in a variety of contexts, including marital status, family status, age, and fertility.23 In
Fisher v. Vassar College, a professor was denied tenure and alleged that the denial was due to
her status as a married woman.24 The court indicated that it would be extremely difficult for a
plaintiff to succeed on a sex plus marital status claim because there are so many categories of
marital status (divorced, cohabitating, etc.) that such a factor might become unmanageable.25 In
addition, the plaintiff in Fisher faced the stumbling block facing many sex-plus claimants – the
18

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
Jolls, supra note 9, at 647.
20
Intn’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1977).
21
See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1989).
22
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
23
See Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420 (2d Cir. 1995) (sex plus marital status); King v. Trans World Airlines,
738 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1984) (sex plus family status); International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187
(1991) (sex plus fertility).
24
Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1433-34.
25
Id. at 1434.
19
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requirement of a similarly situated subclass. Despite a rather damning collection of statistics
showing the infrequency of promotions to tenured positions for married women, the court found
that the plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence comparing married women to married
men.26
To succeed on a sex-plus claim, the plaintiff must compare her treatment to a
corresponding subclass of men with the same characteristic. For example, “when one proceeds
to cancel out the common characteristics of the two classes being compared ([e.g.,] married men
and married women), as one would do in solving an algebraic equation, the cancelled-out
element proves to be that of married status, and sex remains the only operative factor in the
equation.” Lex K.Larson, Employment Discrimination § 40.04, at 40-12 (2d ed. 1996). Similar
to the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test, as it is used by most courts, see supra section
II.A., plaintiffs may fail to state a claim when such a subclass does not exist.27 Even the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which has a more liberal approach to the fourth prong of the
McDonnell Douglas test,28 stated that in sex-plus cases, without a similar subclass plaintiffs
could never be successful.29 In Ilhardt v. Sara Lee, the court determined that the plaintiff failed
to prove her prima facia case under the McDonnell Douglas test because there was no similarly
situated comparison subclass.30 The plaintiff was a pregnant attorney working part-time. As
there were no non-pregnant part-time attorneys for comparison, she lost her case because the

26

Id. at 1446.
See Magid, supra note 11, at 838-40. Magid points out that finding a group of similarly situated non-pregnant
employees is often impossible, as the pregnancy itself may require accommodations not needed by other employees.
Id.
28
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
29
Coleman v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997) (reversing
judgment for employee on sex-plus claim because she failed to show similar subclass of male employees married to
subordinates). See also Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1420 (plaintiff incorrectly compared married women to single women, not
to married men); Bryant v. International Sch. Servs., 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982) (must show married men received
better treatment than similar married women).
30
118 F.3d 1151, 1155 (7th Cir. 1997).
27
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court refused to compare her to full-time attorneys, stating, “there are too many differences
between them.”31
However, this seemingly rigid requirement of a similar subclass falters in some
pregnancy-related situations. The EEOC guidelines provide that an employer with an all-female
workforce must still provide benefits for pregnancy-related conditions if benefits are provided
for other conditions.32 Some courts have interpreted this to mean that if a classification violates
the PDA, it is not further tested for gender neutrality by comparison to a similar subclass.33
Unfortunately such a view has not been applied when a subclass is nonexistent for other
biological reasons (i.e. lactating men). If the PDA is viewed as only providing a special
exemption for pregnancy and related conditions, see infra section IV, this narrow exception from
the requirements of a subclass is logical. However, this paper argues that in enacting the PDA
Congress intended to clarify that discrimination can occur whenever there are physical realities
only women face. Thus the rigid adherence to the requirements of matching subclass is
inappropriate.
III.

Gilbert and its aftermath
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the employer provided disability benefits for all

employees, but excluded disabilities arising from pregnancy.34 The employees had successfully
challenged this benefit plan as discriminatory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 but
the Supreme Court reversed, holding:
For all that appears, pregnancy-related disabilities
constitute an additional risk, unique to women, and the
failure to compensate them for this risk does not destroy the
presumed parity of benefits, accruing to men and women
31

Id. at 1155.
EEOC Questions and Answers, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 app. at 202.
33
Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F.Supp. 1393, 1404 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
34
429 U.S. 125, 127 (1976)
32
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alike, which results from the facially evenhanded inclusion
of risks. To hold otherwise would endanger the
commonsense notion that an employer who has no
disability benefits program at all does not violate Title VII
even though the “underinclusion” of risk impacts, as a
result of pregnancy-related disabilities, more heavily on
one gender than upon the other. Just as there is no facial
gender-based discrimination in that case, so, too, there is
none here.35
The Court based its conclusion primarily on the fact that both men and women had equal
access to disability benefits covering the same categories of risks, even though it recognized that
pregnancy is confined to women alone.36 Using an analogy to the equal protection clause of the
14th amendment, the Court concluded that Title VII protected pregnancy benefits only when
exclusion of such benefits was for the purpose of invidious discrimination.37 Borrowing
language from Geduldig v. Aiello, also decided on equal protection grounds, the Court noted,
“there is no risk from which men are protected and women are not.”38 The basic principle of
Gilbert is that gender discrimination consists only of favoring men over women. Distinctions
based on uniquely female characteristics (i.e., pregnancy) are not covered by Title VII.39 In
taking this restrictive approach to the definition of sex discrimination in Title VII, the Court
ignored fundamental biological differences that had real impacts in the lives of working women.
Asserting that the benefit plan was facially neutral also flew in the face of the facts of the case,
where vasectomies, circumcisions, and prostatectomies were covered by the plan.40

35

Id.
Id. at 136, 138.
37
Id. at 136.
38
Id. at 138 (citing 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)).
39
See Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F.Supp.2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (describing the principles of Gilbert). See
also Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F.Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Ky 1990) (explaining that the PDA only changed the
law with regards to pregnancy and did not alter the principle of Gilbert that failure to provide benefits for uniquely
female attributes is not gender discrimination).
40
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 152. The plan also covered female-specific illness and disabilities with the exception of
pregnancy. Id. at 155.
36
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The three dissenting judges argued vigorously against the notion that classifications
based on female-only characteristics were not necessarily discrimination.41 Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens argued that because women were the only sex at risk for pregnancy, they
were being discriminated against. Furthermore, they argued that the comprehensiveness of an
employment policy for each sex must be examined to determine whether it treated the sexes
equally.42 Justice Stevens stated, “By definition, [a rule excluding pregnancy coverage]
discriminates on account of sex; for it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily
differentiates the female from the male.”43
From a biological standpoint, pregnancy or the ability to become pregnant is one of the
major differences between men and women. By denying that discrimination based on pregnancy
equaled discrimination based on gender, the Supreme Court foreshadowed its preference for
treating the question of equality as one of treating all exactly the same, rather than providing
equal opportunity for all.44 Even though the holding, and arguably the logic, of Gilbert was
overturned by Congressional action just a few years later, many courts have used the reasoning
in Gilbert to dismiss discrimination claims brought based on other biologically unique situations
facing women.45 Failing to recognize and provide remedies for women facing discrimination
perpetuates an unequal work situation where courts attempt to ignore biological truths in favor of
a supposed gender-blind justice, which serves only to perpetuate the status quo.

41

Id. at 161-62.
Id. at 155-162.
43
Id. at 161-62.
44
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2346 (2003) (requiring race-conscious admission programs to terminate in
order to reach “equal treatment of all racial … groups.”).
45
Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp.2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (relying on Gilbert to deny plaintiff’s claim for
discrimination based on breastfeeding); Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.Supp.2d 884, 889 (S.D. Ohio 2000)
(relying on Gilbert to find that breastfeeding is not protected); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F.Supp. 867, 869
(W.D. Ky 1990) (same); Budde v. Travelers Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 376 (Colo. App. 1986) reversed by Colorado Civil
Rights Commission v. Travelers Insurance Co., 759 P.2d 1358 (Colo. 1988) (relying on Gilbert to hold that lack of
pregnancy coverage was not discrimination).
42
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IV.

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) was passed in 1978 as an amendment to Title

VII, to ensure that women were protected from discrimination based on pregnancy.46 Section
2000e(k) states:
The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work….47
In Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, the Supreme Court
specifically acknowledged that in enacting the PDA, Congress not only overturned the holding of
Gilbert, but also rejected the reasoning behind Gilbert.48 The Court went on to say that Congress
“unequivocally” rejected the reasoning that a plan, which singled out pregnancy-related benefits,
was facially neutral and non-discriminatory because only women are capable of becoming
pregnant.49
The legislative history of the PDA also indicates that Congress recognized the unique
biological situation facing women and intended to explicitly affirm that Title VII protection
extended to those circumstances. For example, one Congressman stated that “… it seems only
commonsense, that since only women can become pregnant, discrimination against pregnant
people is necessarily discrimination against women …”50 In enacting the PDA, Congress stated
that “It is the committee’s view that the dissenting Justices [in Gilbert] correctly interpreted

46

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981).
Id.
48
462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983).
49
Id. at 684.
50
123 Cong. Rec. 10582 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Hawkins).
47
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[Title VII].”51 In Justice Brennan’s dissent in Gilbert, he emphasized that the “ultimate objective
of Title VII [is] ‘to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those
discriminatory practices and devises which have fostered (sexually) stratified job environments
to the disadvantage of (women).’”52 Justice Stevens’ dissent stated that GE’s policy
discriminates based on sex because “it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily
differentiates the female from the male.”53
The Supreme Court recognized that Congress rejected the holding and reasoning of
Gilbert when it passed the PDA,54 however, the PDA is treated as creating only a narrow
exception to the Gilbert approach towards gender discrimination. Despite Congress’s attempt to
disavow this approach, it remains valid law in some jurisdictions. Additionally, the PDA itself is
construed narrowly to limit the circumstances to which it applies. One author noted that courts
generally focus on the second clause of the PDA (“women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes”) in
finding that pregnant women must be treated identically to other employees, rather than the first
definitional clause (“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions”)
which specifically prohibits discrimination based on pregnancy.55
This approach strips women of rights when acts and policies, albeit facially neutral,
disproportionally impact women.56 The result is absurd cases like Maldonado v. U.S. Bank,
where the court implied that an employer could not fire an employee simply because she was

51

H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750.
GE Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 160 (1976) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green).
53
Id. at 162.
54
See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983).
55
Magid, supra note 11 at 835-36.
56
Id.
52
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pregnant, but could do so if her pregnancy resulted in the need for any time off.57 Providing
protection for pregnancy in the abstract, but limiting protection for any of the biological
manifestations of pregnancy, is akin to no protection at all, and certainly against the spirit and
perhaps the letter, of the PDA.58
The approach to gender discrimination used in Gilbert appears to remain valid law in
some circuits. For example, in Budde v. Travelers Insurance Co., the Colorado Court of
Appeals, by analogy to Gilbert and its equal protection clause analysis, determined that an
insurance plan that did not include coverage for pregnancy was nondiscriminatory.59 Similarly,
in Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., the court for the southern district of New York applied the Gilbert
equal access standard to grant an employer summary judgment against a plaintiff seeking
infertility treatment coverage under an insurance plan.60 In Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., the court
specifically relied on Gilbert, quoting language stating that Title VII “did not apply to a failure to
ensure ‘an additional risk, unique to women, … does not destroy the presumed parity of benefits
accruing to men and women alike, which results from the facially evenhanded inclusion of
risks.’”61 These courts apparently have concluded that the PDA made only a narrow exception to
the Gilbert approach to gender discrimination and did not alter the landscape for other types of
claims. Given that Congress, in attempting to correct these problems, has approached these

57

186 F.3d 759, 766 (7th Cir. 1999). See also Troupe v. May Department Stores, 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994)
(pregnant employee fired because of excessive absences caused by morning sickness).
58
Magid, supra note 11 at 829.
59
719 P.2d 376 (Colo. App. 1986) (reversed by Colorado Civil Rights Commission v. Travelers Insurance Co., 759
P.2d 1358 (Colo. 1988) as inconsistent with the PDA).
60
117 F.Supp.2d 318, 327-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). On appeal the reasoning of the district court was rejected, see Saks
v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 343 (2d Cir. 2003) but the court upheld the decision that infertility treatments
were not protected by Title VII because they applied equally to both sexes.
61
49 F. Supp.2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)). It is interesting that this is the
same court that relied on Gilbert in Saks v. Franklin Covey, only to have its reasoning, at least, rejected on appeal.
See also Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.Supp.2d 884, 889 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (relying on Gilbert to find that
breastfeeding is not protected); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F.Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Ky 1990) (same).
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issues on a piecemeal basis (i.e., legislation for breastfeeding protection, contraception coverage,
etc., see infra section VI. D), these courts may be correct.
V.

Biological Imperatives – When Uniquely Female Characteristics Are Not
Protected.
In many courts, the current approach to gender discrimination claims protects “women”

in the abstract while ignoring their biological realities. For example, in sex-plus discrimination
claims and cases using the McDonnell Douglas test, the requirement of a similarly situated class
for comparison is often fatal to claims where no such class can exist. Biology can make a
comparison class not only unlikely but also physically impossible.
In racial discrimination there are no biological differences affecting people of color alone
that could impact their ability to perform in the workplace. Skin color alone does not create
differences in the ability to work or need for accommodations. Thus the legal system can
approach racial discrimination with a color-blind view – race, or any supposed characteristics
associated with race, can never justify an adverse employment decision.62 By contrast,
biological characteristics unique to women do not allow for such a “gender-blind” approach if
Title VII’s goal of “assur[ing] equality of employment opportunities and … eliminat[ion of] …
discriminatory practices and devices …” is to be met.63 Biological differences can impact a
woman’s capacity to work. In the negative, this provides a business justification for not hiring a
woman or denying certain benefits. To counter-act this effect and prevent a gender-stratified
workplace, a broader concept of what constitutes “discrimination” is necessary.

62

Affirmative action programs are clearly not color-blind. However, these programs are intended to equalize the
position of people of color in the workplace. According the Supreme Court, such programs are not intended to last
forever, because theoretically, discrimination based on race will cease to exist when we all become “color-blind.”
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003) (racial preferences will not be necessary in 25 years). By
contrast, the biological needs of women bearing children will always be noticeable and can have real impacts on a
woman’s ability to participate in the workforce.
63
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 800.
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A. Varied protection depending on the issue.
Congress, in enacting the PDA, recognized that characteristics unique to women could
result in discrimination based on sex, and in fact, were inherent in the definition of
discrimination based on sex. In recent times, claims that failure to include prescription birth
control in an otherwise comprehensive prescription drug benefit plan constitutes gender
discrimination have succeeded far more often and on more sweeping grounds than claims based
on breastfeeding or infertility treatments.64 In the breastfeeding cases, courts state that
discrimination based on biological differences is legitimate.65 The successful cases involving
discrimination based on infertility are decided on the somewhat narrow grounds that infertility is
within the scope of the PDA, while maintaining that the PDA essentially demands neutrality
towards the genders.66 These dramatically different outcomes are hard to justify when
breastfeeding and infertility treatments are, like birth control, unique to only one gender.
i.

Prescription Contraception

America has one of the highest rates of unintended pregnancies in the western world –
approximately 50% of all pregnancies are accidental.67 Without contraception, a woman could
theoretically have 12 to 15 pregnancies in her lifetime.68 Women with unwanted pregnancies are

64

Prior to the cases discussed in this section, no court had found that excluding prescription contraceptives was sex
discrimination. Erickson v. The Bartell Drug Co., 141 F.Supp.2d 1266, 1272 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
65
Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F.Supp.2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Title VII does not apply to failure to ensure
additional risks women alone face); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F.Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Ky 1991) (it is not
impermissible to discriminate based on uniquely female attributes); Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141
F.Supp.2d 884, 890 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (drawing lines based on characteristics held by only one gender is not
impermissible).
66
Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F.Supp. 1393, 1401 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (viewing the PDA as requiring strict
neutrality towards the genders, that is, ignoring pregnancy but not mandating any leniency towards the physical
manifestations of pregnancy.)
67
Christine Vargas, The EPICC Quest for Prescription Contraceptive Insurance Coverage, 28 AM. J. L. & MED.
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less likely to seek prenatal care and more likely to deliver a low birth weight or ill baby.69
Financial burdens from a distressed newborn dramatically increase the already high costs
associated with a healthy baby.70 Of the available types of birth control, only the condom
functions exclusively on men. All of the other forms function exclusively on women.71 Despite
the obvious impacts pregnancy has on the labor force, half of large health insurance plans do not
cover any type of contraception.72 Others will cover much more complicated and costly
procedures, such as tubal ligation and abortion, but will not provide basic contraception
coverage.73
In Erickson v. The Bartell Drug Co., the court stated “the intent of Congress in enacting
the PDA … shows that mere facial parity of coverage does not justify an exclusion which carves
out benefits that are uniquely designed for women.”74 The court noted that Congress embraced
the dissent from Gilbert, requiring employers to “provide women-only benefits or otherwise
incur additional expenses on behalf of women in order to treat the sexes the same.”75 In
requiring the employer to cover prescription birth control to the same extent as other prescription
drug benefits, the Erickson court recognized that women have different health care needs than
men, which must be met to the same extent as other health care needs.76 The court held that it
was immaterial whether contraception was within the scope of the PDA, because Congress’
“decisive overruling of … Gilbert” shows that it intended Title VII to be interpreted to include
69
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unique characteristics of women.77 Thus, the court did not hold that contraception was covered
because it was within the PDA. Rather, it emphatically rejected this and embraced the broader
view that Congress overruled the reasoning behind Gilbert. Under this broader view,
discrimination exists whenever women’s unique biological differences are implicated, whether
or not those differences are related to pregnancy.
In Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., the court concluded that prescription contraception
coverage was included within the scope of the PDA because a woman’s potential for pregnancy
is a protected status.78 Denying women a medicine that “allows women to control their
reproductive capacity is necessarily a sex-based exclusion.”79 Furthermore, the court stated that
Title VII, as amended by the PDA, “recognizes that women have different sex-specific needs for
which provisions must be made to the same extent as other health care requirements.”80
Although it did not go quite as far as the Erickson court, the Cooley court seemed to recognize
that different treatment based on unique characteristics of women could give rise to a
discrimination claim.
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. UPS, the court held that the EEOC
alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion dismiss on both a disparate treatment and a disparate
impact claim when the employer failed to cover prescription contraception in an otherwise
comprehensive health benefit plan.81 With little discussion, the court determined that since the
exclusion burdened only females, it was not gender neutral.82 Also, because the exclusion fell
more harshly on women than men, EEOC had sufficiently stated a claim for disparate impact.83
77
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ii.

Breast-Feeding

The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) recommends that infants be exclusively fed
breast milk for the first six months of life, and for optimal benefits recommends breastfeeding for
at least 12 months.84 The AAP documents research on the significant benefits of breastfeeding,
including decreased infant illness and enhanced cognitive development.85 Benefits also flow to
the mother, including decreased risk of postmenopausal hip fractures, reduced risk of ovarian
cancer, and reduced risk of breast cancer. The AAP also reports that economic benefits from
breastfeeding include reduced health care costs and reduced employee absenteeism for care of
childhood illness. Despite all the reported benefits of breastfeeding, breastfeeding rates remain
low in the United States.86 A significant barrier to breastfeeding is women’s employment. One
study showed that only 10% of women working full-time continued breastfeeding for six
months, as compared to 24% of unemployed women.87 The ability to continue breastfeeding has
class implications, as professional women have greater success maintaining breastfeeding after
returning to work, presumable because of their ability to negotiate more favorable policies.88
Courts addressing breastfeeding have uniformly rejected the inclusion of breastfeeding
within the scope of the PDA or as discrimination deserving protection under Title VII generally.
In Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., the court denied the plaintiff’s sex-plus claim because “men are
physiologically incapable of pumping breast milk, so plaintiff cannot show that she was treated
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less favorably than similarly situated men.” 89 The court, apparently ignoring the fact that
breastfeeding is inextricably related to pregnancy, refused to “elevate breast milk pumping … to
protected status.”90 Similarly, in Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court determined that a
store policy prohibiting public breastfeeding differentiated between “women who breast-feed and
women who do not,” rather than between breastfeeding women and an (impossible) class of
similarly situated (breastfeeding) men.91 The court determined that the comparative group was
breastfeeding women to non-breastfeeding women. Without the requisite comparison to the
opposite gender, the claim failed.
Claims of discrimination based on breastfeeding have also failed under the PDA. In
Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., the court determined that failing to grant leave for breastfeeding
was not gender discrimination “under the principles set forth in Gilbert.”92 The court determined
that breastfeeding is not a medical condition relating to pregnancy because it is not an illness or
disability.93 The court in Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc. also determined that the PDA did not
include breastfeeding, concluding that “the PDA only provides protection based on the condition
of the mother—not the condition of the child.”94 The obvious connection between breastfeeding
and pregnancy seems to be lost on these courts.
As one commentator stated eloquently, “the courts’ failure to recognize [discrimination
against breastfeeding women] as discrimination is apparently grounded in their belief that any
genuine difference between men and women can be a valid and legal basis for discrimination.”95
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It is precisely this approach that Congress rejected when it passed the PDA, vindicating the
dissent in Gilbert. If employers can discriminate based on real biological differences, the goals
of Title VII to “assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those
discriminatory practices and devises which have fostered (sexually) stratified job environments
to the disadvantage of (women)” will never be met.
iii.

Infertility Treatments

Infertility affects approximately 6.1 million people in the U.S.96 Depending on what
statistics are used, about one-third of infertility is caused by female factors, one-third by male,
and one-third by some combination of factors.97 However, regardless of the cause of infertility,
the treatments for it are primarily performed on women.98 Attempting to conceive a child
through artificial means can be extremely expensive, as each in vitro attempt costs around
$10,000.99 Courts rejecting the argument that the exclusion of infertility treatments from benefit
packages is sex discrimination generally rely on two arguments. Either they conclude that
infertility is not within the definition of “pregnancy” in the PDA, or they determine that
infertility also affects men, thus it is not gender-based discrimination at all. The combination of
these two approaches traps women between Scylla and Charybdis. Either infertility is not
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enough “about women” to be covered or it is too much “about women” under the Gilbert logic to
be covered.100
In Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., the court concluded that, “for a condition to fall within the
PDA’s inclusion of ‘pregnancy … and related medical conditions’ as sex-based characteristics,
that condition must be unique to women.”101 The court determined that because infertility
afflicts men and women equally, exclusion of surgical impregnation procedures from the
employer’s benefit plan disadvantaged male and female employees equally.102 The court
recognized that surgical procedures are performed on women alone, but concluded that since the
need for such procedures was traceable to men and women it was not discrimination to exclude
them.103 This logic is irrational. Pregnancy, too, is traceable to both men and women, yet the
PDA does not assume that because the cause is 50% traceable to men, there is no discrimination.
Furthermore, the plan in question did cover penile prosthetic implants and surgical procedures
for men to correct blockages of the vas deferens.104
In Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, the court determined that the term “related
medical conditions” in the PDA did not include infertility, because infertility, which prevents
conception, was “strikingly different” than pregnancy and childbirth, which occur after
conception.105 The court based its decision on the lack of reference to infertility in the legislative
history of the PDA and the determination that because infertility affects men and women, it is
gender neutral.106 The court ignored the fact that infertility treatments are primarily performed
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on women alone. Laporta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., following Krauel, also denied Title VII
coverage to infertility treatments, noting the difficulties in determining who the protected class
would be under the PDA.107 The court went on to compare infertile women to fertile women,
rather than considering whether, as compared to men, women’s unique health care needs were
met.108 The court correctly stated that to claim the protected class was “infertile women” would
result in the absurdity that hiring a pregnant woman to replace an infertile one would be a Title
VII/PDA violation. However, the PDA was passed to protect women precisely because the
unique biological situation they faced resulted in the inability to create a similarly situated class
of men. Similarly, because most infertility treatments are performed on women alone, a similar
situated class of men does not exist.
Some courts have accepted that infertility is within the scope of the PDA when it comes
to adverse employment decisions. In Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., the plaintiff was denied use
of her sick leave for infertility treatments and subsequently terminated.109 The court emphasized
that in passing the PDA, Congress repudiated the both the holding and the theory of Gilbert.110
Determining that the PDA prohibited discrimination based on the capacity to become pregnant,
the court stated, “[d]iscrimination against an employee because she intends to, is trying to, or
simply has the potential to become pregnant is therefore illegal.”111 Reading the statute, the
court found the ordinary meaning of the words “related medical conditions” in reference to
pregnancy included the ability or inability to get pregnant.112 The court viewed the coverage of
the PDA as “concentric circles”, with discrimination based on the fact of being pregnant as the
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core, and abortion and infertility in the next circle.113 The court rejected the argument that
infertility was gender-neutral because it affects both men and women, stating that Congress made
it clear in the PDA that “neutral” discrimination based on pregnancy or related medical
conditions was not neutral at all.114
Unfortunately, despite being more expansive in its understanding of the scope of the PDA
than many, the court determined that the PDA required strict neutrality towards the genders, that
is, pregnancy must be ignored but leniency towards the physical manifestations of pregnancy is
not required.115 Citing Troupe v. May Department Stores, the court indicated that an employer
was not required to ignore an employee’s absences, even if those absences were caused by
pregnancy.116 This approach leaves women in the position that their condition of infertility, in
the abstract, is protected, but the real manifestations of their problem (i.e., need for absences
timed to stages of the menstrual cycle, etc.) are not.
In a related case before the same court, a plaintiff was fired for excessive absences due to
infertility treatments even though she used sick leave to cover those absences.117 The court again
discussed legislative history and the plain language of the statute, determining that the scope of
the PDA encompassed potential pregnancy.118 The court, quoting the plaintiff’s brief, pointed
out that the entire goal of infertility treatments is to achieve pregnancy.119 It further dismissed
the repeated argument that infertility afflicts men and women and is thus gender neutral, stating
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that “a male employee’s infertility treatment does not seek to achieve his pregnancy; in other
words, a male’s infertility does not relate to his capacity to become pregnant.”120
Both of these cases relate to adverse employment decisions linked to use of sick leave for
infertility treatments. It is unclear if either court would approach a question of insurance
coverage for infertility in the same manner. Clearly if an employer provided medical benefits to
deal with male infertility alone it would be discriminatory. But could an employer provide only
benefits up to a certain level, and exclude infertility treatments, as in Saks v. Franklin Covey, that
involve more complicated surgery done on women alone? By assuming the PDA commands
neutrality towards pregnancy (or capacity to become pregnant), requirements for additional
benefits would probably be rejected.
B. Possible Justifications for Different Treatment of Certain Biological Differences
The approach and understanding of Title VII and PDA claims vary widely depending on
the subject in question. As seen above, recent cases involving coverage of prescription
contraception were treated much more favorably than cases involving breastfeeding. From a
strictly intellectual perspective, it is unclear why this would be so. The same uniquely female
health needs that lead courts to support discrimination claims for birth-control coverage also
exist for breastfeeding or infertility treatments. It is possible that an emotional and stereotypical
response is obscuring the law. It may be a residual opposition to mothers in the workplace, or a
message that women with children or women trying to have children should stay home. It could
be a general uneasiness about breastfeeding in a puritanical society.121 It may also be possible
that male judges can empathize with the fear that their partner might accidentally become

120

Id.
See Christrup, supra note 86, at 472. Christrup argues that Puritanical views of motherhood and breastfeeding
result in societal norms that require women to breastfeed in bathrooms rather than public spaces.
121

23

pregnant, as such an event can significantly impact a man’s life as well. By contrast, the reality
of pregnancy itself, and any postpartum needs, falls more squarely on the woman.
Economic concerns may also play a role. This seems particularly true with regards to
expensive infertility treatments, yet there are at least a few cases where infertility was a basis for
a successful gender discrimination claim. There are no similar successful cases for
breastfeeding. It seems unlikely that requiring flexibility for breastfeeding would impose
significant costs, certainly no more than the pregnancy itself.
It is also odd that the courts do not recognize that breastfeeding is intimately linked with
pregnancy and thus included within the scope of the PDA. If trying to become pregnant (fertility
treatments) and trying to avoid pregnancy (contraception) can be considered by some courts to
be within the PDA, certainly an event like breastfeeding, so closely linked to pregnancy itself,
should be covered.
There is an argument that protection for breastfeeding, infertility treatments, or even
contraception, should not exist because these activities are a woman’s “choice”. To frame
breastfeeding as a choice, and require women to choose between breastfeeding and work, is no
different than requiring her to choose between pregnancy and work – a choice Congress and the
courts have clearly rejected. The purpose of the PDA was to affirm the right of women to make
choices to have children, choices that society values, yet continue to be part of the workforce. In
the area of insurance coverage, employers can and do provide coverage for other voluntary
choices. If you break your leg while mountain biking, your insurance does not deny payment for
treatment because biking was “your choice.” Arguably the choice to have children is more
valued by society than participation in potentially dangerous sports. Choice seems to be a red
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herring, raised whenever the courts or the legislature are uncomfortable with the choices women
want to make.
VI.

Possible Solutions

A. Disparate Impact Claims
A successful approach to birth control, breastfeeding, and infertility treatment claims may
be to bring disparate impact claims rather than disparate treatment claims. For example, a
woman might argue that failure to allow breaks for pumping breast milk will unfairly impact
women alone and disproportionately cause women to leave the workforce. Statistics for making
such a case might be difficult as the number of women breastfeeding at any given time is likely
to be small. However, such a case would certainly be easier to make than finding a similarly
situated lactating man. In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, a case immediately following Gilbert, the
same Court decided that a policy denying women seniority when they took leave for childbirth
did have a disparate impact and violated Title VII.122 The Court distinguished Satty from Gilbert
on the grounds that the employer had not denied a benefit but imposed a burden.123 Denying
women accumulated seniority upon their return from maternity leave deprived them of
employment opportunities, unlike the request in Gilbert for the employer to pay additional
benefits.124
The burden/benefit distinction is arguably open to manipulation. For example, being
forced to pay out of pocket for living expenses while on pregnancy disability could be
characterized as a burden, while retaining seniority status could be classed as a benefit.125

122

Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 (1977).
Id. at 141-42.
124
Id.
125
See H.R. REP. 95-948, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4751.
123

25

However, the Satty case signals one litigation approach that may meet with more success than
disparate treatment claims.
Case law provides some guidance in how to frame a disparate impact case in terms of
burdens. In Roberts v. United States Postmaster General, the court acknowledged that men and
women were provided with the same benefit – use of sick leave for their personal, not family,
illness only.126 The court noted that the burden was disparate – “women are forced to resign
more often than men because of their more frequent role as child-rearers…. It is exactly this type
of harm that Title VII seeks to redress.”127 In a similar leave issue, the court in Abraham v.
Graphic Arts International Union found that a ten-day maximum leave policy would “doom”
any employee facing childbirth to “certain termination.”128 This policy affected women much
more severely than men and thus was discriminatory.129 Similarly, in Harper v. Thiolkol
Chemical Corp., the employer’s policy requiring women who had been on pregnancy leave to
have had at least one menstrual cycle before returning to work imposed a burden on women that
men need not face.130 Although it appears that Harper was a disparate treatment case, it
highlights the strength of framing the policy as creating a burden to avoid facing the requirement
for a similarly situated male subclass, which obviously would have been impossible to find here.
Plaintiffs bringing disparate impact cases would be wise to frame the complaint in terms of
burdens imposed, rather than benefits sought.
Disparate impact claims still may face a narrow reading of PDA that assumes, for
example, that an employer is only obligated to treat pregnant women no worse than any
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others.131 Jolls correctly points out that this view is puzzling in light of the availability of
disparate impact claims generally, as women clearly will face disproportionate harm from
restrictive leave policies that are facially neutral.132
B. A more comprehensive view of the PDA and Title VII.
The narrow view of the scope of the PDA and Title VII necessitates drawing biological
lines that defy scientific reasoning. If lactation is not a “medical condition related to pregnancy,”
it is hard to imagine what is. Women do not spontaneously begin to lactate without having been
pregnant. A woman is not required to be currently pregnant when discrimination occurs to find
the employer liable under the PDA.133 At a minimum the conceptualization of the PDA to
include biological events closely linked to pregnancy should be accepted. Given some courts
persistent attachment to Gilbert, Congressional action may be required to achieve such a goal.
Even outside of the context of pregnancy, the interpretation of Title VII to exclude
protection for characteristics that are unique to women seems out of step with the intent of
Congress. Congress enacted the PDA to overrule the decision in Gilbert. However, there is
debate about whether Congress intended to only correct the situation in Gilbert, where pregnancy
was not covered under disability insurance, or whether Congress had a broader goal in mind.134
It may be that Congress merely intended to create a special category for pregnancy. However,
the inclusion of pregnancy in Title VII rather than as disability legislation, as well as the strong
Congressional support for the dissent in Gilbert, speaks otherwise. Congress chose to
incorporate the PDA in Title VII, where it would clarify the regime of rights available to women.
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The PDA changed the definition of gender discrimination; it did not just add pregnancy to a list
of disabilities. As Justice Brennan stated in Gilbert, the “ultimate objective of Title VII [is] ‘to
assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and
devises which have fostered (sexually) stratified job environments to the disadvantage of
(women).’”135
A view that begrudgingly accepts a narrow scope of protection for pregnancy only, while
strictly applying a facially neutral Gilbert rule to all other biological characteristics unique to
women, ignores both the goal of Title VII and the intention of Congress when it overruled
Gilbert. The message of the PDA was not only protection for pregnant women, but also the goal
of ensuring women’s rights in the workplace, writ large.
C. Claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has been used successfully in some cases
involving infertility treatments, but has not been successful in breastfeeding cases. Title I of the
ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability, including discrimination in the provision
of benefits.136 Disability is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities.”137
Reproduction has been found to be a “major life activity” by the Supreme Court.138 In
Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., the court held that reproduction was a major life activity that was
impaired by infertility.139 Furthermore, infertility substantially limited this activity, thus a claim
could be made under the ADA.140 Similarly, in Laporta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the plaintiff
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sustained her cause of action under the ADA because her infertility substantially limited the
major life activity of reproduction.141 Her request for one day of leave was a reasonable
accommodation under the act.142 The court did not allow her claim to proceed under the PDA.143
However, the ADA may be less successful in cases seeking insurance coverage of infertility
treatments. In Saks v. Franklin Covey, the district court ruled that the insurance plan did not
discriminate under the ADA because the plan offered the same insurance to all employees, those
suffering infertility and those not.144
By contrast, courts have consistently ruled against including breastfeeding as a disability
within the ADA,145 and there are problems with associating a normal biological function with a
disability. In a classic catch-22, because the EEOC has explicitly stated that conditions like
pregnancy are not the result of a physiological disorder, and breastfeeding is related to
pregnancy, it cannot be covered by the ADA.146 However, plaintiffs have also been unsuccessful
in getting breastfeeding included within the PDA by these same courts.147 An additional
problem with using the ADA is that for most women, breastfeeding is a normal biological
function. It may be offensive to classify breastfeeding as a disability. Claiming breastfeeding is
a disability also runs counter to public health messages trying to encourage breastfeeding.148
Despite the limitations of using the ADA in a breastfeeding scenario, it does highlight an
interesting paradox in our approach to so-called “women’s issues” like pregnancy and
breastfeeding as compared to disabilities. The ADA is premised in part upon the idea that
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disabled people can be valuable employees and accommodations should be made for them. The
same concept of accommodation when applied to making arrangements for the needs of women
creates serious debate and controversy.149
It does not seem likely that a claim for coverage of prescription contraception could be
framed as an ADA claim. Although reproduction is a major life activity, being fertile, as
opposed to being infertile, is not generally considered a disability or impairment.
D. State or Federal Legislative Solutions
Discrimination could be addressed by more state or federal legislation. On the plus side,
this is the true function of a democratic government – to represent the changing views of the
populous. However, current efforts at federal legislation have taken a piece-meal approach,
dealing with one bodily function at a time. There do not appear to be any efforts to pass a more
general statute that prohibits discrimination based on biological differences. At the state level
legislation can result in uneven protection for women depending on the state in which they live.
At the state and federal level, there have been attempts to address discrimination based on
breastfeeding, infertility insurance coverage, and contraception coverage. In 2001 the Breastfeeding Promotion Act was introduced by Rep. Carolyn Maloney in Congress as an amendment
to the PDA.150 It would prohibit discrimination against women because they are lactating or
because they need to pump milk. In New York a mother’s right to breastfeed is a public civil
right.151 Connecticut and Texas also have laws supporting a mother’s right to breastfeed.152
Georgia law authorizes employers to provide breaks and facilities for nursing mothers but does
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not require them.153 Only Minnesota requires employers to provide unpaid break time to pump
milk and make “reasonable efforts” to provide a place to do so.154
In 2001 the Senate introduced the Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive
Coverage Act. The bill would prohibit health plans from excluding benefits for prescription
contraception or devices if the plans provide benefits for other prescription drugs.155 By 2002,
twenty states passed legislation mandating contraceptive coverage.156 Most of the state laws
have so-called “conscience” clauses, which allow religious employers to exclude coverage for
contraception under certain circumstances.157
Some states have reacted to the failure to cover infertility treatments by mandating health
plan coverage of some or all treatments.158 Fifteen states currently have such a mandate.159 In
Massachusetts, which has the nation’s most comprehensive mandate, one study concluded that
infertility coverage was 0.4 percent of a total family health insurance premium.160 A New York
study determined coverage cost about $2.50 per year.161 Despite these statistics, the widespread
assumption that covering infertility treatments would be far too costly for employers means that
legislative mandates will be difficult.
A more ideal solution may be a federal law that, similar to the PDA, equates
discrimination with differential treatment of women for any biologically unique characteristic.
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This would eliminate the need to have a breastfeeding law, a birth control law, etc., and draw
into sharper focus the fact that Title VII is intended to ensure equal opportunity for all genders.
E. Public Pressure and Policy
There is a perception, at least among professional level women, that egregious actions
with regards to pregnancy and motherhood no longer occur. Businesses tout their family
friendly policies162 and women expect equitable treatment in the workplace. It may be this
expectation of “rights” that explains “bad” plaintiffs,163 as these women may be shocked to
encounter discrimination and determined to fight it. As Williams and Segal point out, prior to
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, people generally did not have a sense of their rights with
regards to sexual harassment in the workplace, and indeed those rights may have expanded as a
result of sexual harassment litigation.164
Cases of discrimination based on pregnancy and motherhood continue. In Bond v.
Sterling, Inc., an executive with a jewelry company was fired after she refused to leave her fiveweek old baby in New York while she attended a “managers seminar” in Disneyland.165 In
addition, during her pregnancy her supervisor told her “we are not a family oriented company,
we are a business.”166 The plaintiff survived a motion to dismiss on her PDA claim, and one
speculates that such publicity was hardly beneficial to Kay Jewelers.167 As the pressure to attract
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and retain women in professions continues, workplace policies may evolve, not just to remain
within the law, but to retain talented employees.
The existence of a sense of “rights,” which may not actually exist in the workplace, could
be a valuable tool for improving the opportunities available to women. A problem with relying
on this approach is that it does little to help working class women, who may be viewed as largely
fungible and also may see themselves that way. As such they may not feel entitled to much, and
employers may not feel any pressure to provide more.
VII.

Conclusion

Failure to recognize the unique biological needs of women will perpetuate a system that
can always find some supposedly rational business reason for excluding women from the
workforce or excluding coverage for medical needs specific to women. An overly narrow view
of the intent and purpose of the PDA and Title VII leads to a continuation of discrimination
against women for their biology alone. A combination of litigation, legislation, and public
pressure is needed to achieve the ultimate goal of Title VII – “to assure equality of employment
opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devises which have fostered
(sexually) stratified job environments to the disadvantage of (women).”168
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